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The paper investigates the rapid, FDI-driven expansion of the electronics 
industry in the V4 countries from the second half of the nineties through their 
inclusion into the global value chains of East-Asian lead firms with their home 
base in countries, such as in Korea, Taiwan or Singapore and China. The paper 
analyses opportunities for upgrading of East-Asian manufacturing subsidiaries 
and their local suppliers in the V4 region towards higher value-added activities, 
and the level of the subsidiaries’ embeddedness after 30 years of their appearance 
as well as their impact on trade relations between East – Asia and the V4. 
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The collapse of the socialist regime with centrally-planned economies at the turn 
of the 1990s left the V4 countries (Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Poland) with the 
immense need for economic restructuring on the macro-level and immediate tasks of 
adjustments on the level of the companies. Hungary reached the GDP level of its last 
pre-transformation year only more than 10 years later, in 2000. The new market 
opportunities on the other hand motivated transnational corporations (TNCs) from 
developed countries, backed by their host country governments to establish closer 
ties with the area. Hungary was the first to turn towards foreign direct investments 
(FDI) by offering opportunities through privatization and green-field industrial sites 
with tax incentives to foreign enterprises. Shortly thereafter Czechia and Slovakia 
joined the competition for FDI followed by Poland as well. 
 
The electronics industry played an important role in the CEE countries from the 
1970s, however with signs of declining efficiency, lack of innovation and 
technological investments in the 1980s. The restructuring of this industrial sector 
from the 1990s, improving its productivity and gaining access to the world markets 
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in the new market-driven economic system took place predominantly through the 
subsidiaries of foreign TNCs, a part of them venturing out from their East-Asian 
head-offices to the new economic area. The year of EU–accession of these countries 
in 2004 marks another important milestone in the integration of the V4 region into 
the global economy, starting already with the pre-accession trade and economic 
liberalization steps.  
After reviewing the development of the electronics sector in the V4 countries in 
the years of the economic transition, the research focuses on company strategies, in 
particular in the TV set and components manufacturing sector. A more elaborate 
picture is drawn from the 30 years history of Samsung Electronics in the CEE 
region, as a case study of company strategy and regional development. The 
cooperation-competition phenomenon between the East-Asian giant players has 
impacted the development of the sector in the individual V4 countries too. 
 
2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY AND INWARD 
FDI IN THE V4 COUNTRIES FROM 1990 
 
2.1. The gloomy picture at the beginning of the nineties 
 
After the end of the bipolar geopolitical era, the V4 countries have become 
integrated into the global markets and started to adjust towards global consumption 
patterns and standards. “Trade liberalization was an integral part of economic 
reforms aimed at introducing market competition in the east through the 
liberalization of prices, by elimination of subsidies and privatization of state-owned 
industries”. [Nikolaidis, 1997:210]. The countries were hardly protected earlier by 
Western-type import tariffs and non-tariff barriers, as companies had to obtain 
administrative licences to import. As soon as the administrative barriers disappeared, 
they were more vulnerable than their Western trading partners. [Nikolaidis, 1997]. 
In 1989, electronics was suddenly exposed to imports from Asia and domestic large 
conglomerates gradually lost their markets. [Radosevic, S. 2002]. 
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2.2. FDI and output growth from the mid-nineties 
 
While Western-European and North-American players in various segments of 
electronics were cherry-picking from good deals offered through the privatizations, 
East Asian firms had their first manufacturing base in Western-Europe already, and 
sporadically ventured out to the new location with lower labour costs to support 
their European market expansion. From 1997-2007 in the EU-27 countries overall, 
the industry sector electrical machinery and optical equipment manufacturing grew 
at a pace of 4.5 % per year, more than double the average for the total manufacturing 
industry (2.1 % per year). The growth of the sector was driven by radio, television 
and communication equipment manufacturing (up on average by 5.4 % per year 
between 1997 and 2007). Finland, Hungary and Ireland were the most specialised 
EU member states in this sector, as electrical machinery and optical equipment 
manufacturing provided between 9 % and 10 % of their non-financial business 






























Source: Eurostat Statistics explained 2012 
 
Chart 1. Regional concentration of the Electrical Machinery and  
Optical Equipment Manufacturing in Europe in 2006 
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Chart 1. shows a strong concentration of the industry in Germany, Austria and 
three of the V4 countries, with highly involved northern regions in Poland as well. 
In 2007 electronics goods accounted for more than a third of industrial exports from 
Hungary, and around a quarter of the total from the Czech Republic, Ireland, the 
Netherlands and Finland. While electronics manufacturing was established on solid 
ground in the V4 countries during those ten years, R&D activities have been centred 
in knowledge clusters outside of the area, encompassing universities, research and 
design centres and manufacturing facilities, such as Dresden (Germany), Dublin 
(Ireland), Grenoble (France), Catania (Italy), the Nijmegen-Eindhoven-Leuven axis 
(Netherlands/Belgium) or around Helsinki (Finland). In the radio, television and 
communication equipment sector Western OEMs were faced with intense 
competition from the Far East and tried to encounter with innovation the method of 
imitation – incremental innovation strategy of East-Asian producers. [Eurostat 
Statistics explained, 2012].  
Exceptionally outstanding was the development in Hungary. “Hungarian growth 
rate in electronics in 1996-1999 was the highest in the world. With 87% annual 
increase they were far ahead of the rates for Chinese and East Asian economies.” 
[Radosevic, 2002: 7]. By 2000 in absolute terms, Hungary and the Czech Republic 
were “by far the biggest exporters of electronics goods in the region with the overall 
share of 77% of CEE exports”. [Radosevic, 2004:6], thanks also to investments of 
East Asian television manufacturing players, like Samsung in Hungary and 
Matsushita in the Czech Republic.  
Processes of accelerated globalization from the beginning of the nineties have led 
to a new organizational innovation in the development of TNCs, the emergence of 
their global networks. The ICT revolution allowed the coordination of complex 
networks at a distance. Decreasing transportation costs through technological 
advancement and great differences in wage costs between developed and 
developing/emerging economies made the separation of production stages dispersed 
geographically crossing borders. These networks have become especially important 
in the electronics industry and became widespread first in South-East Asia through 
the expansion of Japanese companies. Shortly thereafter it has been spreading 
worldwide, resulting in transcontinental trade and investment exchanges, with 
increasing vertical specialization. These processes influenced the possibilities of the 
CEE economies in transition in their economic restructuring endeavours. 
 
 
3. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK, LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The methodology of the research on the expansion of East–Asian lead firms is 
connected to two major frameworks of analysis which have been formulated in 
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the academic literature after the Millennium, the Global Value Chains (GVCs) and 
the Global Production Networks (GPNs).  
The most widely used framework of analysis in the European academic literature 
is the Global Value Chains (GVC) research. It finds its roots in Michael Porter’s 
value chain model [Porter, 1985] and the global commodity chain theory, which 
examines the chains coordinated by buyers and the producers [Gereffy-
Korzeniewiecz 1994, cited by Gereffi, Fernandez-Stark, 2011]. In the case of 
„producer-driven” commodity chains, it is the beginning (R&D activity, product 
development) that gives the strength of the value chain (automotive and electronics 
sector).  
By 2000 the concept was further developed into the framework of global value 
chains (GVCs) [Gereffi, Lee, 2016]. It concentrates on the sequence of value-added 
from the conception of the product to the end-user. From a top-down view, it 
examines how lead firms govern globally their subsidiaries and suppliers. Typical 
stages of the value chain are R&D, product planning and design, production, 
marketing, distribution and after-sales services. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) 
introduced the definition of upgrading, describing it as a movement towards higher 
value-added activities within the chains. Researchers use their widely accepted 
typology of upgrading - namely product, process, functional and intersectoral 
upgrading trajectory of foreign subsidiaries.  
At the beginning of the Millenium in many respects, a similar, however distinct 
analytical framework appeared, i.e. the Global Production Network (GPN). Its 
analysis in a broader context the cultural, sociological and geographical aspects of 
the impact that development has on the territories these networks encompass 
[Henderson, et.al 2002, Parilli et al, 2013]. GPN brings together a “wide array of 
actors, such as firms, state institutions, labour unions, consumers, non-governmental 
organizations in the transnational production of economic value” [Coe-Yeung, 
2015:15]. Researchers with the GPN framework usually collect information leaning 
on qualitative methods of case studies and can conclude mainly on the national 
level.  
Fierce competition in the global electronics industry has shifted international 
firms and host countries’ positions in the electronics industry in the past 30 years. 
Global shifts of dominant players in the V4 countries will be analysed by the 
research and the GVC, GPN frameworks will be tested on 30 years of activity of 
Samsung Electronics in the V4 countries. 
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4. COMPANY STRATEGIES: INTERNATIONAL TV MANUFACTURING 
FIRMS ENTER INTO THE V4 REGION 
 
4.1. General overview on corporate-level developments after 1989 
 
As Radosevic summarizes, “a defining feature of production networks in 
electronics is their organisation around geographic regions, with each lead firm 
establishing similar production organisations in Asia, Europe and North America 
(Linden, 1998; Ernst, 2000)” (Radosevic, 2002:8). At first, Western-European TNCs 
(Philips, Thomson) in electronics took advantage of the much lower production 
costs and abundantly available skilled labour in the CEE countries to expand their 
regional core networks. They dominated the market, based on cathode ray tube 
technology. Philips built an extensive network for consumer electronics establishing 
17 subsidiaries in Hungary from the beginning of the nineties. From among the East-
Asian manufacturers, Samsung Electronics from Korea entered first in 1989 into 
Hungary. US firms joined shortly thereafter as well in other segments of the 
electronics sector. (IBM Hungary, Motorola Czechia). By the end of the 1990s, the 
geographic shift of the industry induced Japanese firms (Matshushita, Sony) to 
relocate their facilities from the EU, in particular from the UK into the region. 
Global competition reduced the product-life cycle in the electronics industry. 
Several leading, original innovator TNCs started to concentrate from the mid-
nineties on R&D, brand management and have started from the mid-nineties to 
outsource partly or wholly their productions to contract manufacturers, or with the 
widely used term EMS (electronic manufacturing services) partners. They started to 
design, manufacture, test, distribute and provide return/repair services for Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). After the Millenium several US-based contract 
manufacturers have expanded their European operations to Czechia, Hungary and 
Romania (e.g. Flextronics, Celestica, Jabil, Solectron, Sanmina) East-Asian firms 
started to join Global Production Networks as simple component manufacturers and 
developed their production and design capabilities – becoming large EMS 
corporations themselves [Yeung, 2016] e.g. (Foxconn, Taiwan,). Only two 
important endogenous manufacturers survived the transition period from the CEE 
region and could follow the path of fast catching up opened by this radical 
organizational change, the Hungarian Videoton and Czech Tesla Ecimex. 
[Radosevic, 2002]. Videoton has become from an OEM of various final products the 
biggest indigenous EMS company with head office in Central Europe. Following the 
2008 crisis, the company tripled its turnover by 2018 and ranks no. 3 based on 
value-added among the European headquartered EMS providers employing more 
than 10.000 persons. [Videoton website]. The other large Hungarian TV producer 
under the socialist regime, Orion’s main factory in Budapest, was privatized to 
domestic owners and acquired in 1998 by the Singaporean Thakral group. The 
many-sided activities of 
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today medium-size firm still include LCD TVs. [Thakral website]. Orion’s 
countryside plant was acquired by Samsung Electronics as early as 1989, which 
have become a major player in the V4 electronics industry even to date. “Strong 
complementarities between strategies of MNCs, local large and SMEs, state 
administrative capacity and FDI incentives, jointly with actions of local 
governments and attraction of EU demand and EU accession have to be taken into 
account if we are to understand why CEE countries have managed to integrate into 
global production networks in electronics. The network alignment is driven by 
MNCs, is pulled by EU demand and confined to local subsidiaries of MNCs.” 
[Radosevic, 2004:12-13]. 
 
4.2. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS IN THE V4 REGION 
 
Samsung Electronics’ activity in the V4 countries is reviewed in current research 
both from the aspect of upgrading based on the GVC framework, and the 
introduction of the array of actors and their role in embeddedness according to the 
GPN framework. The circumstances for the qualitative research, semi-structured 
interviews could be created around Samsung Electronics’ largest European TV 
manufacturing facility in Hungary, in the small city of Jászfényszaru. Three 
interview rounds were achieved with the company in 2015 and 2017 and two 
interviews with major Hungarian suppliers in 2017, as well as three interviews 
regarding the local environment: with the mayor of the locating city and the 
managing director of the Industrial Park, where the factory is based and the head of 
the related secondary school.  
The core research questions put forward with the Samsung case study are the 
following:  
• Have subsidiaries and domestic suppliers within the Samsung Electronics 
Global Value Chain achieved an upgrading trajectory in the V4 region during the 
last three decades? 
• Have the local subsidiaries been integrated with useful linkages into the host 
economy?  
The evidence from the few empirical research studies is mixed, pointing out that 
plugging into GVCs in emerging countries does “not necessarily lead to the 
formation of strong linkages between foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms.” 
[Pavlinek, Zizalova, 2014:5]. Sass-Szalavetz (2012) show that even though the host 
country may connect in the production stage, eventually may pull development 
activities with it, because the physical presence of the R&D engineers can be 
required close to the production. [Sass, Szalavetz, 2014] 
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4.2.1. Samsung history and identity 
 
Large “chaebols” are characteristic of the Korean economy, which consolidated 
their dominant position thanks to generous subsidies in the “Park Chung Hee Era” 
starting from 1961. The highly centralized decision-making combined with the 
Confucian heritage of the Korean society gives a strong home country identity to the 
internationalizing Korean firm. “The enterprise culture attaches great importance to 
a “friendly relation to the environment,” also when considering FDI. [Glowik, M. 
2010:112]. At the same time as literature and empirical-based research underlines 
that “Korea’s business elite has a preference for Western ways of thinking, which 
encouraged learning from industrialized countries along with imitation of advanced 
technology and management.” [Glowik, M. 2010:114]. The network building 
attitude of Samsung emerged already at the birth of Samsung Electronics in 1969. 
The start of this “infant” industry in the Korean economy was strongly supported by 
Japanese technology and know-how transfer. By the Millenium Samsung 
Electronics (SE) had become Samsung Group’s strongest division. SE with stable 
and prospective business performance in 1999-2007 overtook its Japanese 
competitors’ global position, above all that of Sony. It concentrated on its core 
competence and related business segments including mobile phones. At the same 
time, Samsung internalized within its network with deep vertical integration the 
entire scope of the value chain from R&D till worldwide distribution and sales. 
Samsung Electronic’s capability for the deep vertical integration derives from its 
“chaebol” character, where the “green-field” industrialization forced the large 
conglomerates to create within their networks all supportive functions including 
trading house and banking arm. The top management of Samsung recognized the 
danger of favouritism, buying from within the groups hindering competition and 
started to run each business unit as a separate profit centre, which supports 
competition with outside suppliers. [Glowik, M. 2010:125]. 
 
4.2.2. Internationalization in the second half of the ’80s and entering the V4 
region 
 
An important pillar of South Korean economic development has been the 
internationationalization of its companies. Samsung Electronics was the first Korean 
company which established in 1982 a manufacturing facility overseas, in Portugal, 
exactly in the field of colour TV set manufacturing, shortly before Portugal entered 
into the European Community. An acceleration of the global expansion started when 
Lee Kun-Hee took over the Samsung Group in 1987 after 5 decades from his father, 
who founded the company in 1938.  
UK manufacturing was initiated in 1987, and shortly thereafter, in the very early 
stage of its internationalization, Samsung Electronics (SE) grabbed a sudden 
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opportunity investment in a Hungarian TV factory of a major Hungarian 
manufacturer Orion in 1989 in the small town of Jászfényszaru, at 60 km distance 
from Budapest. Hungary was the first country from among the V4 countries, that has 
established diplomatic relations and parallelly signed major agreements on 
investment protection, avoidance of double taxation and the intergovernmental 
agreement on Scientific and Technological Cooperation with the Republic of Korea 
in 1989. Hungary’s first inclusion into the global value chain of international 
corporations can also be explained by the factor of productivity difference among 
the four low-cost countries. Czech labour productivity on PPP exchange rates 
reached only 58 %, Polish one 39 % and Slovakian one 18 % of the Hungarian level 
in the mid-nineties. [Radosevic 2002:41]. „The gaps were swiftly narrowed and 
closed later on, which were reflected in the FDI results of the other V4 countries as 
well.” [Magasházi, Szijártó, Tétényi, 2015:15).  
The Korean-Hungarian 50-50 % joint venture of SE started its operation in April 
1990, and by June 1990 100 % ownership was acquired by SE in the factory with an 
annual production of merely 200.000 pieces of television sets. A major jump in the 
production figures occurred in 1998 when the production was transferred from SE’s 
British factory. By installing in 1999 the third production line, the factory became 
Europe’s main manufacturing site, with a major contribution to the exceptionally 
high growth rate of output and exports in the Hungarian electronics industry in the 
second half of the nineties.  
The global success of SE in the nineties, the positive experience with Samsung 
Electronics Hungary (SEH) paved the way for further expansion in the region. The 
investment decision in 2001 about a new factory in Galanta, Slovakia has brought an 
extraordinary expansion in the Slovakian electronics industry. The favourable 
experience in cost-competitiveness resulted in further consolidation of Samsung’s 
TV production in Europe moving the production from the Barcelona factory and the 
remaining UK factory to Slovakia in 2002. Unemployment in Galanta reached 19 
percent in 2002 and fell to 15 percent after the entry of Samsung employing 1000 
persons.1 In 2006 a logistic and distribution centre was built in Galanta, in 2008 a 
new investment went to Voderady by the Samsung Display Division for LCD panel 
production – employing altogether 6000 people in Slovakia in the peak year, 
dominating the Slovakian electronics industry.  
Although Samsung Electronics has not invested in a manufacturing plant in the 
Czech Republic, its sales company Samsung Electronics Czech and Slovak in 
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A. CEBR. Vol.7. No. 01. 2018 Figure 1. p. 20. 
 
Chart 2. Samsung Electronics and other Samsung division’s investments in the V4 
region 
 
Although SE does not have a TV manufacturing plant in Poland, Poland plays a 
special role in the global value chain of Samsung Electronics, especially in the ICT 
business line. In order to capitalize on local knowledge, in 2000 the Samsung Poland 
Research and Development Institute (SPRDI) was opened in Warsaw under the 
direct supervision of SE Korea. The institute developed at a very fast pace and 
claims to be the biggest and fastest-growing modern technology R&D Centers in 
East-Central Europe. The high level of technical education, the conducive 
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business environment behind the successful operation of the Institute and financial 
incentives contributed to the decision to open branches in other Polish cities in 
2011-2013 in cooperation with local universities. In 2021, the Institute is operating 
at two sites, in Warsaw and Cracow and boasts of having submitted 200 patent 
applications, yearly 60 papers to scientific journals in its core areas of research, 
Artificial Intelligence and software development. The institute’s researchers have 
high mobility within Samsung’s international R&D network. [SPRDI website]. 
 
4.2.3. Level of upgrading within Samsung Electronics Global Value Chain 
 
The early and successful reaction of Samsung to technological change globally in 
the visual display industry has brought very fast product upgrading after the 
Millineum in the Hungarian, and in the Slovakian subsidiary, too. At the end of 
1999 SEH started to produce digital TVs, in 2004 flat-panel LCD TVs, and in 
September 2005 as the first factory in Europe produced TVs with slim picture tubes, 
moving then later further to LED, OLED TV production. Although the products 
represented always the highest technological level, the main production activity has 
been assembling until today. Investment in new buildings allowed process 
upgrading, too. In a new plant from 2007 mainboards have been produced and chips 
surface mounted into the mainboards as a new, higher value-added production 
activity, increasing production value by 20 % immediately at similar employment 
level. Process management systems, such as Kaizen have been adopted globally and 
locally to increase efficiency. The newest factory unit was opened in June 2014, 
enabling the production of extra-large TVs. Higher value-added functions such as 
sales, marketing, procurement, compliance, product programming, production 
process management were added to the assembly activity leading to functional 
upgrading and are concentrated on the site of the plant. [Magasházi, Szijártó, 
Tétényi 2015]. International expansion of SEH, managed out of Hungary, can be 
considered as a special functional upgrading element. The SEH branch opened near 
Oradea, in Madaras, Romania has been integrated as a lower cost base for job work 
production. Classical basic or applied R&D functions, new products or application 
development have neither been transferred to Hungary nor to Slovakia, engineers 
employed (ca. 3 % of the 3000 persons employed in Hungary) have been mainly 
managing the production process. 30 years later a substantial part of the blue-collar 
workers are still engaged in lower-skilled assembly activity, several hundreds of 
them in 2019 in both plants were coming from Serbia, Romania and Ukraine. A 
determined shift towards higher value-added, higher-paid activities has not occurred, 
plants have remained vulnerable to intra-company cost-optimizing efforts of SE. 
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The Polish experience within SE’s global value chain is different, supported also 
by an innovative restructuring of their educational system from 2000, honoured by 
TNCs not only from East –Asia but from Europe and the US as well (Motorola, 
Microsoft, Google, ABB, Unilever etc), which locate and expand their R&D posts in 
the electronics industry to Poland. 
 
4.2.4. National and local network connections, intra- and interfirm relationships 
analysed by the Global Production Network framework 
 
Research points at the role of network elements as the main pulling factor apart 
from the EU demand for the inclusion of CEE countries in GPNs. The relationship 
between the global head office and local subsidiary plays a strong network 
alignment role, but a connection to national governments by both head office and 
subsidiary, relationship to local government by the subsidiary has its special 
significance [Radosevic S. 2002:55]. Tax allowances, grants in compliance with EU 
rules from the national government have had a positive contribution to SE’s decision 
on new investments according to the interviews in Hungary and news reports from 
other V4 countries. Such allowances were mostly coupled both in Hungary and 
Slovakia with employment requirement commitments in return. In the case of the 
latest Hungarian investment in 2014 Samsung committed to employing 75 more 
FTE, while, SE Slovakia committed in 2012 to keep the number of its FTEs at the 
level of that time for 6 years in Voderady. It is not by chance, that the SE head office 
waited till 2018 to close down the Voderady plant. The V4 plants have remained 
still in the lower value-added segment, thus a competitive threat within the SE 
global value chain for new products and investments have been further increasing 
from China and Vietnam, where besides lower production costs, the substantial 
market increase is experienced by the rapidly increasing middle-class. 
 
Local governments generally in the CEE region have an equally important role as 
national governments. After several years of lobbying towards the national 
government and 25 years of presence, road No. 32 connecting SEH with the 
highway was finally upgraded in Hungary. The dynamic mayor lady of 
Jászfényszaru, Dr. Marta Czegledi played personally a crucial role in safeguarding a 
conducive environment from the first day in 1989 till to this date in 2019. She and 
her colleagues in the other V4 countries act as trouble-shooters in the administrative 
jungle of rules and regulations of the transition economies. As the chaebol type of 
enterprise, culture aims at a friendly relation to the environment and if it meets with 
a dynamic proactive, cooperative local government, favourable social upgrading can 
be observed. The Hungarian host city, Jászfényszaru of merely 6000 inhabitants has 
kept its population level in the past 3 decades. The local government established 
1998 its wholly-owned industrial park to support Samsung’s further expansion and 
attract suppliers to its immediate proximity. 
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Similar initiatives unfolded in Galanta as well. Traditional fields of arguments 
regarding the level of local taxes were handled in regular consultations with SE local 
management. Interviews conducted by the author in 2018 in Jászfényszaru revealed 
the decisive role of local educational institutions mainly at the secondary level to 
counteract increasing labour shortages, which induced SE to CSR contributions to 
this field. The Samsung Smart School was opened in 2014 in a historic building of 
Jászfényszaru and advanced IT education on the elementary level was supported by 
30 smart classrooms.  
Regarding intra-firm relations within the SE GPN head office – subsidiary 
relations of strategic issues, investments, mid-term planning are handled from the 
global head office, governance of the local production and sales in Hungary and 
Slovakia is run by joint Korean and domestic local management. Both in Hungary 
and Slovakia Korean language degrees were introduced in two major universities 
after 2007, at Comenius University in Bratislava and ELTE University in Budapest 
to contribute also to intercultural communication. With the continuous improvement 
of the production process and local skills, a technologically balanced, competitive 
situation emerged between the two large European production sites of Samsung. The 
Hungarian and the Slovakian units have supplied Samsung with the whole European 
market offering similar cost-level and investment benefits for the expansion. 
Shifting parts of production occurred due to currency appreciation before Slovakia 
joined the eurozone. SE Slovakia’s revenues in Galanta fell in EUR terms and the 
subsidiary reported a net loss of 31 million EUR in 2007, while it achieved in 2006 
still net profits of 106 million EUR2. SE’s immediate response was to move the 
production of plasma TVs to Hungary at the beginning of 2009, motivated beside 
the push factor by the pull factor of weakening HUF. Lack of available workforce 
offered for lower value-added activity at the wage level ensuring the expected 
profitability led to the consolidation of the production activities within Slovakia, the 
Voderady plant was closed in 2018, 10 years of its inception and available non-
foreign workers were motivated to move to the Galanta plant.3 Further reduction of 
employment in the remaining plant in Galanta came at the end of 2019, with the 
argument of changing global markets of television sets. Behind the reduction of 
workforce from 1500 to 1000 in 2020, a cost-optimization move could be observed 
again, two divisions were transferred to Hungary, where besides the advantage of 
the generous corporate tax cut from 2017, lower labour and energy costs measured 




2 Based on the study of Electrical Engineering in Slovakia in 2008. A project for the Ministry of Economy of 
Slovakia, September 2009.  
3 https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20748727/samsung-will-shut-down-its-slovak-plant.html 
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HUF. By the end of 2019 production volume halved and the number of employed 
decreased from 6000 in the peak period to altogether 1000 persons in SE Slovakia, 
which remains a major producer and exporter in the electronics industry.  
Regarding interfirm relationships within the host countries, Radosevic concluded 
in 2002 that FDI driven development of the CEE electronics industry indicated only 
modest linkages with local SME supplier base at the end of the nineties [Radosevic 
2002]. The research undertaken in 2015-2017 has shown, that the last decade 
strengthened local SMEs role in the network alliance architecture of SE. Samsung’s 
globalization strategy aims to utilize local know-how and experience to be 
competitive and successful in the local markets. A few Korean suppliers came 
earlier in the nineties, which later on moved out again. The Korean Sangjin Micro 
built in 2014 its new factory in the Jászfényszaru Industrial Park for metal spare 
parts supply. SEH uses as a powerful lobbying argument towards the national 
government the 70-80 % local supplier share, selected by strict procurement 
procedures. According to the interviews, SEH engineers invest heavily time and 
money into on the spot training of their suppliers, tacit knowledge is gained through 
several years of working together on thoroughly  
negotiated economic, technical and quality assurance terms. The relational aspect 
with culture -to culture learning is such an asset, that has allowed a few major 
local SMEs of the region to grow together with their major client for several 
years. They are capable and are flexible to react immediately even in case of 
last-minute orders, confirmed also in two main supplier’s interviews.  
Two exemplary cases were analysed, based on desk stop research and interviews  
with SEH’s representative and major local suppliers, Jász-Plasztik Ltd., Jászberény, 
start- ups in plastic moulding in 1990 and Ferro-Press, Jászberény in metal 
spare parts processing in Jászberény in 2002.  
Jászplasztik applied for government grants and realized larger investments from 
the second half of the nineties, delivering to the two competitors in TV 
manufacturing, Samsung in Hungary and Sony in Slovakia. Jaszplasztik moved first 
with a joint venture to Galanta, Slovakia in 2001 to avoid border crossing 
restrictions in delivering Sony. Samsung Electronic’s location search in 2002 led 
also to Galanta, becoming the neighbour of its Hungarian supplier. Jászplasztik 
employed 2200 persons in Slovakia, 3000 in Hungary and 450 in MadrasRomania, 
at the time of the author’s interview with the owner in 2017, relying already on 
foreign labour, too both in Hungary and Slovakia. In 2011 SEH invited both 
suppliers to locate with them to Madaras, Romania. The two major Hungarian SEH 
suppliers represent positive cases to study the mechanism of how TNCs use non-
equity mode suppliers (NEMs) for governance in their GPN in a relational context. 
The long term TNC-supplier relationship in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania has 
created the tacit knowledge behind the transaction of collaborating 
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efficiently together, creating a kind of mutual dependence between the TNC 
and its supplier with increasing potential switching cost for the TNC. On the  
other hand, SEH as a client constitutes one-third of Jászplasztik’s product portfolio and 
a break in the relationship would certainly impact severely the company. The giant 
modern production facilities, the embeddedness into the environment with the supplier 
and institutional linkages, constantly improving infrastructure in Jászfényszaru and 
Galanta during the 2-3 decades still safeguard the two locations.  
Changes in SE’s global position in the TV set product group, considerable 
geographical shifts in global market demand and disruptive changes in 
technology can however bring sudden challenges. 
 
5. THE COMPETITION AND COOPERATION OF EAST ASIAN FIRMS 
IMPACTING THE V4 REGION 
 
A major change in the television market was the replacement of the cathode ray 
technology of the 20th century with LCD and plasma TVs from 2005 onwards, 
which was dominated by the Asian manufacturers. A wide range of corporate 
websites, industry sectoral newsletters, academic journals was reviewed to give a 
concise picture in Enclosure 1. of the expanding activity of East Asian TV set and 
LCD panel groups in the 1989-2019 period in the V4 region. European 
manufacturers established international joint ventures with East-Asian counterparts 
to stay on the market. Philips transferred its display related business in a joint 
venture with LG, Thomson integrated its TV set business with TCL China from 
2007 – but finally both exited TV set manufacturing, leading to the closure of their 
factory in the V4 (Philips in Hungary) or leaving over the business line to its 
cooperation partner – competitor. (TCL, TV Technology from Hong Kong). The 
majority of investments from 2007 in the European television set industry have been 
concentrated in Poland (LG Philips LCD, LG Electronics, Sharp, Toshiba, and 
Jabil). Industry clusters were expanding in Hungary around Samsung, the Czech 
Republic around Matsushita/Panasonic and IPS Alpha Technology, in Slovakia 
around Samsung and Sony. Samsung seems to have won the battle for the time 
being holding a 20 % global market share, which benefits the development of its V4 
subsidiaries. The Korean giants: Samsung and LG took over the market from their 
European and Japanese counterparts, which could not be hindered by alliances 
(Sony-Sharp, LG – Philips, Matsushita-Toshiba, Thomson-TCL), or involving EMS 
partners (Hon Hai).  
Regarding the LCD panel segment, by 2008 20 LCD panel suppliers were 
located in Japan, South Korea, China and Taiwan. [Glowik, M. 2010:109]. The East-
Asian economic literature has created a colourful metaphor, “water lilies” describing 
the diffusion of knowledge between the East-Asian LCD clusters 
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stretching over the above countries. It illustrates through this sector, how the 
industrial cluster can become a regional competitive advantage through the 
efficiency-optimizing activity of TNCs. The configuration, how FDI flows creating 
clusters at distant new locations, resulting in knowledge dispersion to the new 
concentrated location – starting from Japan and arriving into Korea than moving 
further to China has resembled floating water lilies. „The „water” between the lilies 
represents less developed, areas, unaffected by the positive impact of TNCs’ 
investments”. [Magasházi, 2021:66]. By 2012, Korean (LG Panel, Samsung), 
Japanese firms (Sharp) and Taiwanese enterprises ensured 90 % of the global LCD 
panel demand. [Han, Oh. Yoo, 2012]. In 2020 Samsung Display still had a dominant 
market share, followed by other East-Asian players. In Europe, LCD panel 
manufacturing started in 2007 exclusively through FDI of East-Asian-based firms: 
three in Poland: LG Panel and Humax from Korea, and the Japanese Panasonic, 
Sharp in Czechia and Samsung in Slovakia. The cluster that emerged in the V4 
countries has spread “water lilies” into the region. These firms compete with each 
other on capacity, prices, product development, process technologies, customers, 
marketing and capitalizations leading to reposition of the players, but they also 
cooperate in various fields. In 2012 Panasonic closed its factory in Poland, and in 
2018 Samsung closed its LCD panel factory in Voderady, at that time employing 




Whether FDI contributes to the economic and social goals of the host countries 
including sustainable development and social well-being is far not automatic. It 
depends on several external and internal factors. From the beginning of the 1990s, 
FDI has been the major vehicle of integration of electronics firms – foreign 
subsidiaries, EMS partners and local SMEs – based in the V4 countries into global 
production networks. By the end of the nineties, all four countries established 
themselves as low-cost electronics supply platforms. (HU – Samsung Electronics, 
Philips, SK- Sony, CZ – Matsushita, PL–LG, Thomson, Philips). With strong impact 
by Samsung Electronics (SE) FDI, the Hungarian productivity, manufacturing 
output and exports expanded in 1996-99 exceptionally well. In the first half of the 
nineties SE was seen globally as a producer of cheap television, but successfully 
modified this image with strong marketing efforts, innovative product design, large 
product development and R&D investments towards a premium brand manufacturer, 
offering a full TV product range. SE with a narrowly knitted vertical integration 
framework still produces most of the components of its final product by group 
affiliated companies. In 2020 the  
 
 
4 The Slovak Spectator 29th January, 2018 
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Samsung brand was 5th on the world ranking, with 31,9 % market share 2020, has 
led the global television market for 15 consecutive years5. It has had a very strong 
impact on the Hungarian and Slovakian electronics industries. The year 2004 did not 
only bring the four Visegrad countries’ entering the EU but a major disruptive 
technological change in TV manufacturing as well. The cathode ray tube (CRT) 
technology of the 20th century, mastered by Western-European manufacturers was 
suddenly replaced by LCD technology, where Asian producers had taken the lead in 
innovation and product development. The huge majority of the LCD-TV producers 
manufactured their products in-house, building up vertically organized GPNs, for 
which the V4 countries, above all Poland and Czechia, became hotspots with 
emerging clusters. The search identified more than 22 East-Asian manufacturers, 
and additionally an increasing Asian network of contract manufacturers and 
suppliers in the specialized areas in the V4 region. Japanese positions in the 
meantime have been taken over by the Korean global market leaders Samsung and 
LG, while the European players (e.g. Thomson, Philips) were replaced by the 
rapidly developing Chinese (including Hong Kong and Taiwan) firms entering 
through M&A the V4 area (TCL). Although V4 countries played a supportive role in 
network alignment, through intensive local government support and industrial park 
support schemes, the move towards higher value-added, knowledge-based 
activitivities to be assigned by the East-Asian lead firm to their subsidiaries remains 
to be seen in the electronics manufacturing of all the four countries. The more active 
role of the national governments to develop the national innovation system and 
sectorally focused, high-quality educational programs could contribute to leaving the 
image of the low-cost electronics manufacturing base. The current position of V4 
countries’ firms within the global production networks has anyhow been challenged 
in recent years by the dramatically increasing labour shortage. 
 
The two giant V4 plants’ position within SE’s Global Production Network 
with an escape route to second-tier production location for the lowest cost activities 
in Romania were deeper analyzed. The research results suggest that network 
alignment have been developed on all three levels: state-firm, intrafirm and interfirm 
during the 30 years of operation and seems to have created relatively strong 
embeddedness and longer-term commitment to the location. Product and functional 
upgrading trajectories could be identified, however, the major part of the production 
activity remained assembly work. The two large factories in neighbouring countries 
supplying the European market seem to strengthen each  
 
 
5 https://www.flatpanelshd.com/news.php?subaction=showfull&id=1614155663 Samsung tops global markets for  
15 consecutive years 21.2.2021 
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other’s position and their embeddedness in the V4 region despite their day to day 
competition. Although strict control follows the different locations from the 
Samsung Electronics head office, it is no the tax advantage that keeps SE in the 
region. The global minimum corporate income tax of 15 %, as endorsed in June 
2021 by the G7 Finance Ministers is expected to have no major impact, even if i t 
will be implemented by the G20, which grouping the Republic of Korea also 
belongs to. The most relevant factors are jointly production-related cost sensitivity 
and market proximity for the assembly segment of TV sets.  
Looking at the global picture just before the onset of the global pandemics, 
Samsung Electronics consolidated its TV set production into a few worldwide 
locations 6 and except for Hungary, all countries apply corporate income taxes (CIT) 
above 15 %.  
 














       
   (pcs)                    
 Brazil  10 million    Latin America 34 %  
 Egypt  6 million    Middle-East and Africa 22,5 %  
 Hungary  8 million 3000  Europe 9 %  
 Mexico  18 million    US, Canada 30 %  
         Europe (through SEH    
 Romania  n.a.    Hungary) 16 %  
 Russia  7-8 million    Russia, Eastern Europe 20 %  
 Slovakia  monitors and TVs 1500  Europe 21%  
 Vietnam  n.a. 60000  Asia, Africa 20 %  
 Korea  only pilot products    no mass production anymore 25 %   
Sources: government sites, PWC and Asia Briefing on CIT 
 
Table 1. shows clear patterns for the importance of market access. The assembly 
plants in Jászfényszaru Hungary, and currently to a smaller extent in Galanta, 
Slovakia are the sole providers of TVs to the European Markets, except for Russia 
and some other Eastern – European countries that are supplied the Russian plant. 
Romania’s support for production was more relevant in 2012-2015 during a strong 
market boom. The plant in Mexico supplies North America, Brazil in South 
America, in Egypt Middle East and Africa, while in Vietnam covers Asia and to a 
large extent Africa, too.  
The importance of cost level is justified by Samsung’s exiting from the 
Malaysian, Thai, Korean, Chinese and Indian TV set manufacturing operations in 




6 https://en.tab-tv.com/ Anatoliy Marcin 15/11/2019 Where are Samsung TVs made – accessed on 17/6/2021 
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production to Vietnam in most of the cases, except for India, where a 5% import 
duty levied on flat TV panels by the government motivated the decision to leave in 
2019. The Indian government finally fine-tuned the relevant legislation mid-2020, 
and Samsung will resume operation in Chennai after 2 years production break. R&D 
Centers remained in Korea, China-Shenzen and India, Bangalore.  
The Samsung Group’s strong commitment towards Vietnam as the location is 
reflected by the stock of FDI growing 26-fold between 2008-2018 to 17 billion 
USD, out of which 9,5 billion was invested by Samsung Electronics in its 
smartphone and television manufacturing complexes.7  
The construction of a giant Samsung R&D Complex started in spring 2020 in 
Hanoi. It is expected to be operational by the end of 2022 with a total investment of 
220 million USD and will employ 3000 researchers.  
There is an urgent need in the V4 countries to step forward towards knowledge-
based activities soon in the field of electronics, as the closure of the Voderady plant 
in Slovakia in 2018 also confirms. Out of the four countries, Poland started to leap 
forward with a systemic education reform, accounting for the first results and 
attracted SE’s R&D and product development activity to Polish locations from 2000. 
Samsung has been the global market leader in television-set manufacturing for more 
than a decade, thus sudden exit due to market conditions has not endangered the V4 
manufacturing units. The 30 years of Samsung Electronics in Hungary and 20 years 
in Slovakia certainly contributed to the development of of the local regions where 
they are situated in, has created employment also in a production-related engineering 
function, has taught local SME suppliers to adapt to global market circumstances. 
Relying on the current, mainly assembly type activities, however, cannot guarantee a 
future for these jobs in less than a decade. The 30 years of mass production know-
how, large facilities, disseminating risks geographically justify the V4 twin factory’s 
position in the mid-term if labour shortage is handled and Samsung’s innovation can 
keep its  
unparalleled market position, but the local municipalities and their national 




















Coe, N. – Yeung, H. W. (2015): Global Production Networks: Theorizing Economic 
Development in an Interconnected World, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
ISBN-13: 978-0198703914  
Glowik, M. (2010): Market Entry Strategies: Internationalization Theories, Network 
Concepts and Cases of Asian firms: LG Electronics, Panasonic, Samsung, Sharp, 
Sony and TCL China. Oldenburg Verlag, München  
Magasházi A. (2021): Singapore Globally Entangled – Lessons for Central Europe? 
Epilogue on Covid-19 Impacts. Institute of Advanced Studies, Kőszeg, 2021 Porter, 
M.E. (1985): Competitive Advantage. Creating and Sustaining Superior  
Performance. The Free Press, 1985. ISBN-13: 978-0684841465  
Yeung H-W (2016): Strategic Coupling: East Asian Industrial Transformation in 
the New Global Economy. Ithaca. The US. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-
1-5017-0255-6 
 
Book chapters  
Nikolaidis, K (1997): „East-European Trade” In: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph Nye, 
Stanley Hoffmann (ed): After the Cold War, International Insitutions and State 
Strategies in Europe. 1989-1991 Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 
Massachusets and London, England 1993. third printing 1997. ISBN 0-674-
00864-2 (pbk)  
Magasházi A, Szijártó N, Tétényi A (2015): „Integrated in global value chains by 
Korean-V4 participation” In: Gress M, Grancay M (ed.) Mutual relations 
between the Republic of Korea and V4 countries in trade and investment . 
Conference proceedings International Scientific Conference and Workshop.  
191 p. Bratislava: Vydavatelstvo Ekonóm, 2015. pp. 156-177. ISBN:978-80-225-
4207-4 
 
Journal articles  
Endrődi-Kovács, V., Kutasi, G., & Magasházi, A. (2018): „Visegrád Group Expertise 
and Position in the Samsung Global Value Chain: A Case Study of Samsung 
Electronics in the V4 Countries.” Central European Business Review, Prague 7  
(1), 14-36. DOI: 10.18267/j.cebr.193  
Gereffi G. Fernandez-Stark K, (2011): „Global Value Chain Analysis: A Primer”. 
Center of Globalization, Governance & Competitiveness (CGGC) Duke 
University, Durham. North Caroline, USA.  
Gereffy G. – Lee J: (2016) „Economic and Social Upgrading in Global Value Chains  
and Industrial Clusters: Why Governance Matters.” Journal of Business Ethics, 
 
Global Problems – Local Answers 197  
 
133 (1):25-38 Published Online first: 23 September 2014. 25-38 DOI  
10.1007/s10551-014-2373-7  
Henderson J. – Dicken P. – Hess M. – Coe N. – Yeung H.W. (2002): „Global 
Production Networks and the analysis of economic development.” Review of 
International Political Economy 9. 436-464 o.  
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002): “How Does Insertion in Global Value Chains  
Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?” Regional Studies, Vol. 36. 9.: 1017–  
1027, 2002 DOI: 10.1080/0034340022000022198  
Parrilli M.D., Nadvi K. & Yeung H. W-C. (2013): „Local and Regional Development in 
Global Value Chains, Production Networks and Innovation Networks: A 
Comparative Review and the Challenges for Future Research,” European Planning 
Studies, Vol.21. Issue 7. July 2013: 967-988. ISSN 1469-5944 (Online)  
Pavlinek, P, Zizalova, P. (2014): “Linkages and spill overs in global production 
networks: firm-level analysis of the Czech automotive industry”. Journal of 
Economic Geography 16 (2), 331-63  
Radosevic S. (2002): „The electronics industry in Central and Eastern Europe: An 
emerging production location in the alignment of networks perspective”. 
Working paper 21. Center for the Study of Economic and Social Change in 
Europe. School of Slavonic and East European Studies. University College 
London. March 2002. 1-64 ISSN 1476-1734  
Sass, M. – Szalavetz, A. (2014): „Crisis-Related Changes in the Specialization of 
Advanced Economies in Global Value Chains”. Competition & Change. 18/2014 
18: 54-69. ISSN 1024-5294 
 





Han, T. – Oh, K. – Yoo, I. (2012) From Bamboo Capitalism to Water Lily: LCD 
Industry in East Asian Countries. International Conference on Innovation and 
Information Management (ICIIM 2012). http://www.ipcsit.com/vol36/048-
ICIIM2012-M0133.pdf IPCSIT vol. 36 (2012) © (2012) IACSIT Press, Singapore  
http://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_hosszu/h_qpt001.html 
https://www.industryweek.com/workforce/panasonic-close-czech-lcd-panel-  
plant Source: Agence France Presse, 31st October, 2012  
Radosevic S. (2004) The Electronics Industry in Central and Eastern Europe: A  




Enlosure 1. Investments of the largest East-Asian TV manufacturers in the V4 region (1989-2019) 
 
 
Company name home cy 
rank 
host cy 
1st Invested (initial) 
Expansion Location Remarks 
 
 
2018 invest. amount 
 
        
 Samsung Electronics Korea 1 . HU 1989/90 530 (20) mUSD 2007/2014 Jászfényszaru  2003 SK, 2009, RO managed by HU  
 Samsung SDI Korea  HU 2002 n.a. 2007 Göd  Closed in 2014, 2016 new car battery inv.  
 Samsung Electro M. Korea  HU 2001 20 mUSD TV comp. Szigetszentmiklós Supplies components for display assembly  
 Samsung Electronics Korea  SK 2003 750mSVK+70 mEUR 2006/2012  Galanta Voderady workers offered job in Galanta  
 Samsung Display Korea  SK 2008 n.a. LCD Panel Voderady Voderady closed in 2018, labour shortage  
 Samsung Electronics Korea (R&D) PL 2000 n.a. 2011/13 Warsaw Poznan, Lodz till 2015, Cracow remained  
 Daewo Electronics Korea  PL 1994  TVs Pruszkov closed in 2009  
 LG Philips/LG Korea 2. PL 1999 64 m USD LCD TV Mlawa   
 LG Philips/LG Korea 2. PL 2007 560 m USD 2012 OLED near Wroclaw LG cluster - European hub of subsidiaries  
 Humax Korea  PL 2006 30 mio EUR LCD panel Belchatow   
 Sony/Foxconn Japan 5. SK 1996 124 mio USD 2008 LCD Trnava, then Nitra in 2010 Foxconn bought 90% of Sony Nitra  
 Hisense China 4. HU 2004 n.a. LCD-TV Sárvár,Szombathely Closed down in 2009  
 Matsusita/Panasonic Japan 10. CZ 1997/2006 4,3 billion CZK LCD-TV Plzen el. resistor and relay plants came in 1999  
 Panasonic/IPS Alpha Japan  CZ 2007 n.a. LCD panel Zatec Closed down in 2012  
 Changhong China 2.CHN CZ 2006 30 mio EUR LCD TV Nymburg   
 Funai Electric Japan  CZ 2007 n.a. LCD-TV Nowa Sol in 2010 name changed to Funai Europe  
 Sharp Japan  PL 2007 44 mio. EUR LCD pan Lysomice/Torun supplies to Sharp, Spain  
 Toshiba/Vestel Japan/TK  PL 2007 43 m USD LCD TV Wroclaw in 2016 Turkish Vestel acquires the plant  
 Hon Hai (Foxconn) Taiwan EMS SK 2005/2010 80 mio USD/n.a.  Nitra,Pardubice Sony factory sold to Hon Hai   
 TCL China 3. PL 2018 AI R&D Center  Warsaw   
 Thomson, TCL FR/China 3. PL 1997/2004 301 mio USD 2013/2018 Zyrardow JV TTE 2004-2007 failed, TCL brand  
 TPV Technology NL/HK 7. PL 2008 n.a.  Gorzow   
 TP Vision/Philips NL/HK  HU 1990/2012 (25) m USD  Székesfehérvár 2013 production transferred to PL  
           
 TP Vision/Philips NL/HK  PL 1995/2012 101,2 m EUR  2007 Kwidzyn Plant taken over by EMS Jabil Circuit  
 
Source: compiled by the author (press releases, articles), Radosevic (2002: 22-23), interview. Ranking is based on 2017 LCD TV market share by Statista  
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